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It is commonly believed that the capacity for curiosity is essential for doing science. Curiosity is 
also the one notion that allows science to keep ethics at bay. While there have been efforts to  
develop an ethics of science, they have largely been directed to ‘applied’ sciences. But the funda-
mental ethical problem is about curiosity itself. Should curiosity be restrained? The concept of  
curiosity has a long and interesting history, and the birth of modern science is concurrent with  
attempts to modify the meaning of curiosity. This paper discusses how the scientific community  
rehabilitated curiosity in order to negate ethical challenges to the practice of science and also sug-
gests ways to inquire into the ethics of curiosity. 
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The troubled relationship between science and 
ethics 
WHAT does ethics have to do with science? After all, for 
over centuries there has been a sustained belief that sci-
ence is not answerable to ethical concerns. Science as a 
specific kind of activity (and discourse) is often seen to 
be independent of ethics. This belief is so much ingrained 
into the science community that even today prominent 
scientists as well as students of science echo the belief 
that science only discovers truths, and the ethics are only 
in the context of how the products of science are used or 
misused. The most common example is that of the knife: 
a knife is used to kill but it is also used for other useful 
purposes. When used to kill, one should not blame sci-
ence (as far as the knife is seen as a product of science). 
This is an oft-repeated argument for shifting the ethical 
responsibility from science to the larger set of users of 
science – this might include the ordinary citizen as well 
as governments. In doing so, what is reiterated is the fact 
that the truths of science are transcendental truths, outside 
human interests and therefore, outside ethical concerns. 
 The philosophers supply ammunition to this position 
by distinguishing between facts and values, a distinction 
that has a long intellectual history. This philosophical 
distinction offers one possible way to argue for science’s 
independence from ethics. Science is a discourse of 
facts – facts about the universe. Ethics is about values – 
values held by humans. Scientific truth and facts are not 
human-centric. In fact, their exalted status arises prima-
rily because they are thought to be independent of human 
subjects and thus it is reasonable to expect that they are 
not concerned with ethics. This distinction is reinforced 
by what is called the ‘naturalistic fallacy’ by philoso-
phers. This is the fallacy of confusing the world of facts 
and values, the ‘is’ with ‘ought’. The world of ‘is’ is the 
world of facts and the world of ‘ought’ is the world of 
normative ethics. How one ought to behave is an ethical 
question whereas how the world is a matter for science.  
 But, even if we subscribe to the view that facts and val-
ues should not be conflated, there is still a problem for 
the science–ethics relation. Science is not merely a de-
scriptive enterprise. It does not just list out the facts of 
the universe. Science is as much about intervention as it 
is about description1. In fact, explanation, which is an  
important category for modern science, is privileged in 
science because it affords a greater control over interven-
tion in the world. In other words, science understands the 
world in order to intervene in it, to ‘re-form’ the world to 
suit our needs and desires. Many contemporary discus-
sions on ethics and science – for example, the ethics of 
cloning and stem cell research – centre around this inter-
ventionist strategy of science.  
 By intervening in the world, scientists deflect the ques-
tion of ethics from the ‘pure’ to the ‘applied’ domain. 
The creation of these two categories of the pure and  
applied is itself an interesting move within the sciences. 
Pure science is often placed in ‘opposition’ to applied 
science (including engineering). The privilege given to 
pure sciences has had significant impact on the growth of 
scientific institutions. The hierarchy in which the pure is 
‘above’ the applied is commonly reflected in the practice 
of science even today.  
 How is this distinction tenable? One way to understand 
this distinction is by invoking the idea of ‘disinterested-
ness’. This idea has been used by philosophers in effec-
tive ways. For example, Kant uses this idea as a defining 
marker in his definition of art. Disinterestedness is  
another way of expressing the absence of human interest 
in any belief or claim. It also suggests lack of prior moti-
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vation, ‘ulterior motives’, in doing something. The claim 
is that pure science reflects this disinterestedness. Its dis-
coveries are about the way the world is and therefore 
cannot be influenced by human interests and desires. Pure 
science captures this character of science that it uncovers 
a set of human-independent truths. Applied science is  
application of these discoveries and scientists do not have 
much trouble in accepting that such applications can be 
influenced by individuals, state, religion and so on.  
 The very distinction of the pure and applied is already 
value-laden. The usual opposites of pure are ‘impure’, 
‘contaminated’, and so on. Applied is not exactly con-
trary to pure but has elements of these contraries. The 
value given to the image of pure is indeed very signifi-
cant – purity is associated with the mind in certain states, 
to austere practices of the body, to high ethical action, to 
individuals who perform certain heroic acts and so on. 
Pure has high ethical value in religious systems. It has 
similar value even in areas such as chemistry where the 
isolation of the pure substance can be a worthwhile chal-
lenge. Racially, the idea of the pure has significant con-
notations and has spawned various fundamentalist 
challenges to society. It is in this larger world of the 
‘pure’ that ‘pure science’ should be located. Given this 
trajectory of the pure, the word ‘applied’ in ‘applied  
science’ may have pejorative connotations. Applied is 
somewhat ‘impure’ – the taint or the contamination 
comes from the mixing of human interests in what is pure 
knowledge. The value to the applied is the value of mate-
riality and not the value of disinterested inquiry. This also 
means that pure in the pure sciences does an important 
job for science – it keeps pure science out of the concern 
of ethics. Pure science is seen to be above ethical chal-
lenges. It is not that the claims of pure sciences are ethically 
sound or unsound; it is that they are not answerable to 
ethics first of all. If ethics is applicable to science at all then 
it must be in the domain of applied science – this is the 
commonly voiced claim about science in the context of 
ethics. This argument is so pervasive that scientists com-
monly use this for ethical questions on a whole range of is-
sues ranging from uses of knife to nuclear energy/bomb.  
 It is striking that even in an essay published as recently 
as 2006 (and republished in an edited book in 2007) a 
scientist, Mario Bunge, rehashes the same argument. For 
example, the first section in this essay is titled ‘Do not 
blame scientists: Frisk technologists’. Here Bunge con-
tinues the problematic distinction between basic and  
applied sciences and notes that ‘basic science, which is 
the attempt to understand the world, was mistakenly attri-
buted the power to change it’ (ref. 2, p. 29). He continues 
to echo the most prevalent cliché about science and ethics 
in saying that ‘technology can be used by industry or 
government for either good or evil . . . nuclear engineer-
ing, which is based on nuclear physics, can be used either 
to design nuclear plants or nuclear bombs’. He goes on to 
title the next section as ‘The ethics of basic science’ 
where he reiterates the convenient distinction by noting 
that ‘basic scientists’ (who work on basic science) need 
have ‘no such scruples’ (ethical ones which might afflict 
the technologist) because ‘his work is unlikely to have 
practical uses’ (ibid., p. 30). He also notes that basic sci-
ence is characterized by a particular ethos. Following 
Merton, he lists the elements of this ethos as consisting of 
‘intellectual honesty, integrity, epistemic communism, 
organized skepticism, disinterestedness, impersonality, 
and universality’ (ibid.). All these are virtues which un-
derlie basic or pure science. The interchangeability of 
‘basic’ and ‘pure’ is explicitly expressed by him when he 
notes that ‘basic science is pure, but individual scientists 
may get corrupted’ (ibid., p. 33). These scientists get cor-
rupted ‘when given the opportunity to double as either 
technologists or policy consultants’! He further goes on 
to add that ‘[B]asic research is the search for truth, not 
for wealth, justice, salvation, or beauty’ (ibid.). 
 Bunge is not alone in his beliefs about basic/pure sci-
ence and its ethos. Countless scientists place enormous 
emphasis on these beliefs although it seems obvious that 
there is little that is pure about pure science. The rewards 
of doing pure science is also material – witness the  
human drama around claims of originality, authorship, 
politicking for getting prizes and so on. None of these 
motivations are disinterested! But the reason why this 
distinction continues to be so important today is that there 
is an underlying ideology in insisting on this distinction 
as well as celebrating the ethos of the pure. I believe that 
this distinction and the invocation of the pure is primarily 
the most effective way of deflecting ethical concerns  
addressable to science. Scientists take this position so 
that they can escape from the ethical imperative and in 
doing so are exhibiting their political agenda of safe-
guarding their work against pressures of the larger society. 
The fact that they have managed to escape from answer-
ing to the ethical challenge so far illustrates the effective-
ness of this ideology.  
 In this paper, I will consider one essential catalyst for 
this distinction. While disinterestedness and other such 
characteristics are markers of pure science, they are all 
based on a human capacity, the capacity for curiosity. 
Many influential narratives on science by scientists de-
scribing why they do science identify the nature of curi-
osity as a primal characteristic of the scientific attitude. 
Curiosity is a special faculty of the mind. Curiosity is not 
reason; rather, it needs reason to sustain it. Curiosity is 
what is common to the child and to the scientist, leading 
psychologists and philosophers to find parallels between 
a scientist and being a child3. This is a position that finds 
strong resonance among practising scientists and contri-
butes to the distance between ethics and science for chil-
dren can be excused from ethical excesses. Science uses 
the notion of curiosity to build a wall against ethical criti-
cisms. Therefore, I believe that a proper ethical founda-
tion for science can be developed only if we first 
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understand the ethics of curiosity. But before we do that, 
we need to consider the ways by which science and ethics 
are coming together in recent times. 
Putting science into ethics: naturalized ethics and 
the use of scientific method in ethics 
The shift in ethics towards science has two dominant 
paths. One is through biology and this is by situating ethics 
in biological foundations. That is, we can understand our 
moral impulses as biological imperatives. Just as the 
natural processes of our body are dictated by the ‘laws’ of 
biology as well as explained by biological processes, so too 
can we understand morality as somehow related to bio-
logical traits and processes. In a sense, this makes morality 
‘natural’, which counters an excessive dependence on 
culture as the driving force of morality. Central to this 
biological understanding of morality is the argument that 
ethics is a product of a ‘long evolutionary process’ (ref. 4, 
p. 21). The claim that ethics is part of evolutionary process 
implies that ethical principles and rules will help us in 
survival and adaptation. This belief that ethics can be 
traced back to biological and evolutionary roots is often 
called the naturalistic approach. Kurtz, for example, goes 
to the extent to say that the potentialities for good and 
evil have a genetic basis but goes on to note that what an 
individual eventually becomes depends on various influ-
ences. Some biologists have argued for viewing morality 
as a biological process. For example, it is suggested that 
human evolution has led to the capacity of human intellect. 
Calne, speaking from the perspective of biology, suggests 
that our capacity for reason and morality are biological 
products of evolution. He argues that reason (equivalently 
for him, science) and social behaviour (equivalently moral-
ity) ‘evolved together as the primate brain enlarged’ (ref, 
5, p. 329). He points out that damage to the frontal lobes 
can impair both rational activity as well as moral decisions. 
 There is another way of approaching the science–ethics 
relation. Once again this has been championed by those 
who believe in the epistemological primacy of science. 
The basic idea in this view is as follows: Moral principles 
and values are often dictated by religion, politics, ideolo-
gies and so on. There is a fundamental difference in these 
activities when compared to science. What distinguishes 
science is the scientific method, one which opens every 
belief to ‘rational’ evaluation. Thus, moral values should 
also be ‘open to scientific evaluation’ (ibid., p. 13). What 
can scientific evaluation do to values? Kurtz argues that 
moral knowledge justified in this scientific sense will 
lead to ‘wiser decisions’, those based on ‘scientific evi-
dence’. The basic argument here is that we should use 
scientific method to help us make ethically ‘reasonable 
choices’. Given a moral rule on how we should act, that 
rule should be subjected to a scientific analysis, meaning 
that the statement should be answerable to evidence and 
reason, understood in the scientific sense. Ethical knowl-
edge should thus be evaluated like scientific knowledge 
and therefore is open to change if needed. As Kurtz notes, 
for the naturalists, ‘scientific inquiry enables us to revise 
our values and principles, if need be, and/or to develop, 
where appropriate, new ones’ (ibid., p. 20).  
 Kurtz accepts that there are ‘general principles of right 
conduct’ drawn from our cultural experiences, including 
basic norms in societies. The challenge in ethics has been 
to interpret general rules in specific contexts. So, even a 
statement that one shall not kill has to be interpreted in 
various contexts: that one can kill animals, can kill in 
self-defence, can kill in war and so on. Kurtz believes 
that scientific inquiry comes into play when we consider 
general ethical principles in specific contexts. How we 
should deploy these principles in ‘practice depends on the 
context at hand, and the most reliable guide for mature 
persons is cognitive inquiry and deliberation’ (ibid., p. 21). 
He concludes by noting that ‘ethical naturalism attempts 
to solve ethical questions, not by faith or feeling but by 
empirical methods and cognitive inquiry’ (ibid., p. 22).  
 But such a view is possible only if there is a limited  
interpretation of both science and ethics. Kurtz wants  
inquiry to replace faith but understanding ethical judge-
ments as based on faith alone is to be ignorant of a large 
philosophical tradition of ethics. Trying to suggest that 
‘education and persuasion’ (as part of this scientific ethics) 
should replace ‘violence’ is once again to gratuitously  
associate ethics with violence. Once again this is a com-
plete misreading, for anybody who has studied the history 
and sociology of violence will remember science’s essen-
tial involvement with violence in diverse ways. Such a 
view also negates very important ethical theories deve-
loped in other parts of the world, which have found an  
intrinsic connection between non-violence and ethics. For 
example, the Buddhist and the Jaina traditions exemplify 
ethics based on non-violence. In contemporary times, 
Gandhi stands out as the most important thinker whose 
ethics is based on the idea of non-violence. Moreover, the 
strength of naturalistic ethics, namely, the use of inquiry, 
rationality, evidence, contextual deliberation and so on 
are integral parts of these traditional ethical theories 
based on non-violence and sacrifice. The fact that Kurtz 
seems to completely negate these ethical movements is 
only evidence (in the scientific sense!) that these ideas of 
science and ethics are completely localized to a specific 
Western mindset. Such selective misreading of ethics as 
well as of the nature of science is definitely not part of the 
ideal scientific methods which Kurtz and others espouse.  
 Kant’s attempt to ground morality in rationality is well 
known. In fact, in an essay in the same collection, diCarlo 
and Teehan argue that for Kant our ‘essential nature as 
rational beings is the foundation for the moral force’  
(ref. 6, p. 314). What Kant is doing is to base the impera-
tive of moral action on our essential rationality. Kant’s 
rationality is also one that has significant overlap with 
(and influenced by) scientific rationality. I mention this 
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only in order to point out that claims that ethics needs in-
quiry is not new to the discourse on ethics nor is it neces-
sary that science is needed to do this job. Moreover, the 
scientific notions of evidence and reason, for example, 
are not universally valid across all domains. These notions 
which underlie scientific inquiry have specific character-
istics which do not allow their easy access in other disci-
plines including ethics. Their use even in the disciplines 
constituting social sciences has been very contentious.  
 Another possibility to find a science–ethics relation is 
by choosing a different metaphysics. Rottschaefer7 offers 
an analysis of how a ‘scientific naturalistic ethics’ is pos-
sible. For him, this means the acceptance of moral facts 
‘that partially explain what makes action morally right’ 
(ibid., p. 285). The idea of moral facts or moral properties 
is similar to that of scientific properties. Among other 
things, scientific properties describe a causal sequence of 
some phenomena. In the same way, if there are moral 
facts or properties, then they can be used to causally  
explain a moral action. Those who insist that ethics and 
science are essentially distinct would find the invocation 
of moral properties and facts to be problematical.  
 Rottschaefer accepts that science is not only about 
facts. He distinguishes science and ethics by pointing out 
that science is ‘concerned with cognitive values and ethics 
with moral values’ (ibid., p. 286). For the separatists, 
these values are distinct and thus ethics and science are 
essentially separate. The integrationists deny this separa-
tion of these values associated with the cognitive and the 
moral. The denial of the distinction leads to two distinct 
streams: one in which the methodological distinction  
itself disappears leading to the ‘subjectivization of sci-
ence’ and the other in which the methodology common to 
both ethics and science is based on cognitive values thus 
leading to ‘objectivization of ethics’ (ibid., pp. 286–287). 
Rottschaefer identifies seven hypotheses relating ethics 
and biology (and psychology). These hypotheses are 
about how biological and psychological correlates pro-
vide facts, explain moral action, generate normative 
moral principles, justify moral beliefs and so on. His  
motivation is to establish a naturalistic account of moral 
values, that is, to ground moral action in natural moral 
values as facts which have explanatory capacity to  
explain moral action, leading to the view that ‘ethics is a 
moral science’ (ibid., p. 289). This ontological approach 
where the role of moral facts is important, as well as the 
epistemological approach of explanatory structures, are 
brought together in order to argue for a naturalistic ethics. 
Virtue epistemology 
A philosophical response to the above problems illus-
trates yet another way of relating science and ethics. Over 
the last two to three decades, there is increased interest in 
a new approach to epistemology which is called as virtue 
epistemology8. The basic insight in this approach is that 
epistemology and virtue theory are intrinsically related. 
Terms such as duty (epistemic duty), responsibility, good, 
etc. are an essential part of epistemology and these terms 
are derived from the discourse of morality. The distinc-
tion between fact and value is challenged in these  
approaches. Typically, virtue epistemologists – and there 
are different strands within them – focus on values and 
virtues. They understand the evaluation of an epistemo-
logical claim by not restricting themselves to acts or  
belief states but to virtues in the person who is involved 
in the process of knowing. By bringing back the notion of 
‘intellectual virtue’ to prominence, the virtue epistemolo-
gists expand the ways by which we understand the  
notions of justification, belief formation and so on.  
 An implication of such an approach is to accept that 
epistemology is not just about abstract belief or proposi-
tional states but to see it as essentially socialized. This 
means that the knowing subject and the environment in 
which the subject functions are essential parts of evaluat-
ing knowledge claims. Traditional epistemology – 
especially where modern science was an exemplary 
model – was based on the negation of the knowing sub-
ject in evaluation of knowledge claims. Virtue epistemo-
logy brings back the knowing subject and the sociality of 
this subject as an important element of the knowing pro-
cess. Virtue epistemology claims that intellectual virtues 
such as impartiality, intellectual sobriety, courage, curi-
osity, being truthful, sensitivity to detail, intellectual  
humility, fairness in evaluating the arguments of others, 
intellectual perseverance, etc. are essential to the process 
of knowing8,9. Moreover, analysis of problematical but 
crucially important concepts, such as understanding and 
wisdom which are problematic for traditional epistemo-
logy, is central to virtue epistemology.  
 Bringing virtues into the heart of knowledge is to erase 
the distinction between the ‘is’ and ‘ought’, between fact 
and value. It is to say, albeit in a different way than some 
other arguments which make similar claims, that facts are 
value-laden and values are fact-laden. This distinction  
between fact and value has often been used to negate any 
ethical questions addressed to science, since science was 
seen to be the domain of facts and ethics the domain of 
values. Virtue epistemology, without being as scientistic 
as naturalistic ethics, allows us to understand that scien-
tific knowledge shares a common space with ethics.  
 One of the most important intellectual virtues is curios-
ity. It is interesting to note that this idea of curiosity is 
also one that is specially privileged by scientists and 
mathematicians. The heart of science, as scientists have 
often told us over the centuries, is curiosity. A scientist is 
defined by her capacity to be curious and in so doing em-
bodies the virtues of a child. The virtue epistemologists’ 
emphasis on curiosity as an intellectual virtue as well as 
the scientists’ emphasis on curiosity as an essential cata-
lyst (and marker) of science marks an interesting con-
junction of ideas. This is ironical since the scientists’ use 
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of curiosity, as we will see below, is primarily to escape 
any ethical responsibility whereas for the virtue episte-
mologists, curiosity as a virtue should be understood 
within the discourse of virtue ethics. Much harm has been 
done by science in the name of curiosity and thus, if there 
has to be any legitimate ethical response to science, it has 
to begin with curiosity. To really establish any useful 
ethical interrogation of science we have to begin by un-
derstanding the nature of curiosity. 
Science and curiosity 
Why does one do science? Why do scientists say they do 
science? What attracts them to that activity as compared 
to other activities? In popular discourses on science, par-
ticularly by scientists, there is much emphasis placed on 
the excitement of doing science at the individual level. 
The description of this excitement is often in terms of  
notions such as awe, the pleasure of discovering some-
thing new, satiating curiosity, engaging with something 
beautiful and so on. Many of these characteristics are  
derivative to a primary characteristic of the human mind, 
one which is very influential in the original drive towards 
doing science. And this characteristic is that of human  
curiosity. One begins to do science merely because one is 
curious, where curiosity is seen to be a very important 
element of being human. However, although ubiquitous, 
it is not easy to understand the nature of curiosity.  
 Curiosity is seen to be the catalyst that creates knowl-
edge. Because we are curious, we think. Because we are 
dissatisfied with the answers we get, we come up with 
new ways of thinking. Because we are curious, we discover 
methods. We discover science. We can distinguish – 
loosely – different types of curiosity. We may be curious 
about what something is – for example, I see an object I 
have not seen before and I am curious to know ‘what’ the 
object is. We are curious to know why something is the 
case – why is the sky blue? Why is the neighbour’s door 
locked all the time? We are curious about how something 
works. Experimental science is based so much on the 
character of curiosity – our first engagement with tools 
and technological objects is often one of curiosity. For 
example, an experiment was conducted in Delhi which 
involved keeping a computer in a hole in the wall in a  
locality where slum children lived (see http://www.hole-
in-the-wall.com/). Rather than teaching them computers 
formally, these children were exposed to the computer to 
do what they wanted. Remarkably, the children learnt 
many aspects of the computer and they did so because 
they were driven by curiosity. 
 Curiosity is so pervasive but there is often a suspicion 
attached to excessive curiosity. The phrase ‘curiosity 
killed the cat’ is widely used. Often we caution children 
not to be ‘over-curious’. Children exhibit a stronger sense 
of curiosity which seems to diminish as we grow older. 
This trend often fails in the case of good scientists. The 
image of the ideal scientist is one who is eternally curi-
ous – this should remind us of the pervasive view that 
scientists are ‘child-like’.  
 The beliefs about science and curiosity are many and 
deeply ingrained in the scientific community. Some of 
these well-entrenched beliefs are: science begins from cu-
riosity, curiosity is the catalyst for pure science, scientists 
even when they are old should not lose their curiosity, 
questioning attitude comes through retaining the spirit of 
curiosity, science is where ‘curiosity is institutionalized’ 
and so on. Einstein echoes what countless scientists say:  
 
‘The important thing is not to stop questioning. Curi-
osity has its own reason for existing. One cannot help 
but be in awe when he contemplates the mysteries of 
eternity, of life, of the marvelous structure of reality. 
It is enough if one tries merely to comprehend a little 
of this mystery every day. Never lose a holy curio-
sity.’10  
 
Curiosity is often seen as being synonymous with the 
questioning attitude. Here it is worthwhile to distinguish 
between curiosity and doubt. Doubt is an epistemological 
term – it is derivative to something more basic such as 
perception11. I see an object which looks like a man but 
because it is some distance away I am not sure whether it 
is a tree or whether it could be a tall man. This creates 
doubt in me and I have a question concerning that doubt. 
Doubt also can be classified into types of doubt – like cu-
riosity, we have doubt about what something is, why 
something is the case, how something works and so on. 
But doubt is not a human trait that is basic in the way  
curiosity is seen to be. It is not because we doubt that we 
ask these questions – doubt is based on some judgements 
we make about our perception and inference. But doubt, 
like curiosity, is what leads us to questions and also to 
knowledge. However, curiosity is a psychological act and 
not an epistemological one. That is, curiosity is ‘biologi-
cal’ – the fact that some people are more curious than 
others is like saying some people have better eyesight 
than others. But all have eyesight and all of us have the 
capacity for curiosity. Doubt is a higher order term in this 
sense. 
 But interestingly, curiosity was not always held in high 
esteem. Phrases such as ‘nosy parker’, ‘morbid curiosity’, 
‘curiosity kills the cat’ captured the potential problems 
inherent in curiosity. Being curious is also to be too nosy, 
interfering in matters where one is not supposed to, not 
minding one’s business, being too inquisitive and so on. 
Stories in different cultures often are unsympathetic to 
characters who are too curious. In Western thought, the 
impact of the myth of Pandora’s box and what it says 
about curiosity are well known. The influential The 
Golden Ass by Apuleius illustrates the danger of being 
overly inquisitive which leads to disastrous consequen-
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ces. Apuleius is, according to Walsh12, responsible for the 
popular use of the word ‘curiositas’. The main character 
in the novel is punished not only for being curious but 
also for insisting on satisfying his curiosity. A similar 
parallel occurs in the narrative of the folk tale of Psyche 
and Cupid. Psyche pays an enduring price for her ‘rash’ 
curiosity but eventually is saved by Cupid who says that 
‘Once again, poor girl, that same curiosity was your undo-
ing’ (ibid., p. 77). In this case, curiosity as a means to 
knowledge becomes problematical when a person not eli-
gible for a particular knowledge tries to attain it through 
his or her curiosity. (It is interesting that Indian stories do 
not seem to emphasize the negative aspects of curiosity 
as the Western traditions do. There are a few stories such 
as Kunti’s curiosity which leads her to becoming an un-
wed mother but on the whole there is definitely a cultural 
difference in the way this idea has been used in these cul-
tures.) 
 Walsh discusses various senses of the idea of curiosity 
starting from Plutarch, who discusses undue curiosity in 
individuals. Plutarch was worried about the effect of  
curiosity on social habits such as prying into the affairs of 
neighbours, ‘their debts, and their private conversations’ 
(ibid., p. 73). Plutarch then goes on to distinguish two 
ways of responding to the impulse of inquisitiveness. One 
is to avoid temptation to be inquisitive when it comes to 
social behaviour. The other is to direct our curiosity  
towards nature – heaven, earth and sea. Plutarch’s solu-
tion to the problem of curiosity is to distinguish ‘vulgar’ 
curiosity and the more lofty ‘intellectual’ curiosity. Thus, 
development of ‘intellectual’ curiosity, which later on  
becomes so important in the activity of science, should be 
cultivated against the tendency towards vulgar curiosity.  
 The emphasis on intellectual curiosity was also of great 
interest to Augustine. Seneca believed that curiosity 
about nature was a positive virtue and it is interesting to 
see why – for Seneca this kind of curiosity is justified  
because such curiosity towards the world adds to our  
understanding of the value of human life and therefore 
can be seen as a ‘moral pursuit’. Curiosity of this kind, 
one which gets valorized in scientific curiosity, had this 
intrinsic moral character at least in the early Western tra-
dition. (In contrast, such curiosity that characterizes  
modern science has completely been excluded from the 
ambit of morality.) As Walsh notes, the Aristotelian tra-
dition supported disinterested inquiry whereas the Stoics 
argued that such curiosity was justified only if it in-
creases virtue.  
 By the time of Augustine we can see an established 
ideological use of ‘curiosity’. For the Christian tradition, 
curiosity was always problematic – even the fall of Adam 
and Eve is also due to their curiosity. For Augustine,  
attaining knowledge through means other than (and con-
trary to) the Bible was seen to be the work of ‘misplaced’  
curiosity, ‘abominable’ curiosity, ‘impious’ curiosity and 
the like. Walsh suggests that The Golden Ass had a sig-
nificant influence on Augustine’s Confessions. A com-
mon theme of importance in both is the significance of 
curiosity. For Augustine, curiosity was part of the process 
which led him to follow false trails before ‘submitting to 
Christian baptism’ (ibid., p. 82). For Augustine, the curi-
osity of vision is vulgar whereas that of the mind is dis-
ordered. Among the three vices he notes, curiosity is one 
along with pride and lust. Also, the suspicion towards the 
dark arts like magic was encoded in these arts being 
called as ‘the curious arts’ (ref. 13, p. 268). Augustine 
uses the image of lust to describe the acts of curiosity 
such as curiosity being a ‘lust for experimenting and 
knowing.’ He calls curiosity the ‘lust of the eyes’ but we 
should note the implications of a ‘lust of the mind’ which 
is inherent in this view.  
 Given Augustine’s influence on theology and ethics, it 
should not be a surprise to discover the impact of his 
views on curiosity. The medieval theologians continued 
this distrust of curiosity and along with magic, pagan  
religions, necromancy, they attacked astrology (which 
was becoming popular) as an activity which was cata-
lysed by curiosity. Even Aquinas, although accepting the 
study of nature, retained curiosity in the list of vices. The 
condemnation of curiosity was widespread, from the 
Renaissance and Reformation to the age of Puritanism in 
late 16th and 17th centuries in England. As Harrison 
points out, these views on curiosity were ‘not restricted to 
moralists and divines, and allusions to this intellectual 
vice abound in the works of 17th-century poets, prose 
writers, and dramatists’ (ibid., p. 271). Similar to earlier 
views on curiosity, the strongest vice associated with  
curiosity was pride, the ‘deadly sin’. Harrison notes how 
Downame (17th century) claimed that pride and curiosity 
were in a cyclic relation. Pride was the mother of curios-
ity and at the same time, curiosity led to vain knowledge 
which increased (or ‘puffed-up’, a term that begins to get 
used widely around this time) one’s pride. By the 17th 
century, methods of inquiry were subjected to ethical 
analysis and thus each method of analysis came to be as-
sociated with virtues or vices as the case may be. If cer-
tain methods of knowing and inquiry were associated 
with vices such as curiosity, vanity and so on, then it also 
meant that knowledge acquired through such inquiry was 
contaminated by these vices.  
 Not only were astrology and alchemy seen to be the 
‘dubious fruits of curiosity’ but so were subjects like 
mathematics and the mechanical arts in the Renaissance 
‘associated with the proscribed practices of witchcraft 
and magic’ (ibid., p. 277). There is a common structure 
that can be discerned in this suspicion towards curiosity. 
Dominant is the recognition that there is a dual aspect to 
curiosity – ‘the moral status of the inquirer and the nature 
of the proposed knowledge’ (ibid., p. 278). This explicit 
invocation of the moral status of the inquirer and also the 
nature of knowledge derived from curiosity are important 
elements of any ethical response to curiosity.  
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 This suspicion towards vain/pure curiosity and knowl-
edge about the world, one can imagine, must have consti-
tuted a grave challenge to the birth of modern science 
where both these characteristics are essential. Francis  
Bacon is often referred to as a very important figure in 
the establishment of science. In this story of curiosity, he 
also plays an important role. Bacon begins by distin-
guishing knowledge about the world and vain curiosity 
which he relates to magic, alchemy and the like. He then 
argues for the usefulness of knowledge about the world 
by relating it to the ethical virtue of charity. Thus, he 
shifts the association of knowledge with pride, curiosity, 
etc. to a seminal Christian virtue, namely, charity. More 
significantly, he cleverly established the legitimacy of 
studying nature by two arguments – one, by showing how 
such effort is consistent with biblical interpretation and 
the other by denying that knowledge acquisition is not 
morally wrong if done properly. There is a moral conno-
tation to this proper conduct and thus doing natural phi-
losophy (science for us) necessitated ‘certain moral 
qualifications’ (ibid., p. 281). Consider some of these 
qualifications: purity of the mind with respect to motives, 
restricting intellectual lust and ‘tendency to excess’. In 
place of ‘lust and gluttony’ (with respect to the mind) he 
suggests ‘abstinence and chastity’ for proper intellectual 
activity. As Harrison notes, this is an ascetic model of 
seeking knowledge, elements of which are present in  
today’s narratives about working in science, which in-
cludes giving up (or at least have restrained indulgence 
in) the pleasures of the world, a disciplined and sustained 
mental perseverance and so on. For Bacon ‘it is charity 
that must motivate the knower, not curiosity’ (ibid., p. 
282). Therefore, Bacon makes possible the pursuit of sci-
ence in a way that is acceptable to the larger society by 
placing knowledge within the sphere of accepted morality 
as well as erasing negative views on curiosity.  
 From the 17th century positive values got attached to 
curiosity. Hobbes characterized curiosity as a ‘morally 
neutral “appetite of knowledge” ’ (ibid., p. 283). Hobbes 
also used curiosity to distinguish humans from animals 
and thus puts curiosity in a constellation of ideas such as 
rationality which served to make this distinction in Aris-
totle. For Hobbes and Descartes, curiosity was the origin 
of the search for knowledge. For Descartes, the problem 
was in unmethodological curiosity and so he constructed 
methods which will control ‘blind curiosity’. Over the 
course of the 17th century, curiosity was established as 
something natural, something innate which characterizes 
human thought and action. It is not an accident that this 
period also saw the invocation of duty towards attaining 
knowledge. No longer was knowledge to be an idle pas-
time or even something belonging to the curious and evil 
arts but was now the beholden duty of the intellectual to 
pursue. But even when curiosity is accepted as a natural 
part of being human, it was also felt that its purpose was 
to ‘seek out moral regularities in nature’ (ibid., p. 287).  
 Harrison also briefly discusses how curiosity is legiti-
mized by relating it to the Divine. Robert Boyle, among 
others, looked at nature as embodying various curious 
features. Curiosity is thus removed from being a particu-
lar human proclivity to being something which character-
izes features in the world, features which excite our 
curiosity perhaps. (Something similar happens with vari-
ous other subjective concepts such as beauty, which over 
time gets removed from a particular psychological  
response to a ‘property’ inherent in beautiful objects.) If 
curiosity now characterizes the world (so that we can talk 
about ‘curious creatures’, ‘curious objects’, ‘curious fea-
tures in an insect’ and so on) and if the world is created 
by God then the negative value associated with curiosity 
is negated – this argument of Harrison (ibid., p. 287) has 
some force.  
 By the 18th century, curiosity was completely ‘reha-
bilitated’. David Hume’s definition of curiosity as ‘love 
of truth’ was part of this process where curiosity, like in 
the case of Descartes, was the genesis of knowledge. 
Moreover, Hume also claimed that not being curious 
leads to ignorance and ‘barbarism’. So not only is curio-
sity a positive virtue, it is also one that is necessary for cer-
tain positive ends. As Harrison notes, ‘. . . if for Aristotle 
wonder was the beginning of knowledge, for Hume and 
his contemporaries that honor now fell to curiosity’ 
(ibid., p. 287). Harrison concludes by suggesting that the 
trajectory of the idea of curiosity also indicates a shift in 
the way the relation between the knower and the known 
was understood – earlier the moral character of the 
knower was important but this role of the knower loses its 
significance as the notion of curiosity achieves its positive 
status. In other words, the morality of the knower becomes 
less important as curiosity becomes more important to the 
extent that in modern science the morality of the scientist 
is completely erased in evaluating scientific knowledge. 
Thus, an impersonal method replaces the subjective 
knower – a trend which Harrison discovers not just in 
Descartes but also in Bacon and others. And over time 
and with increasing distance between Christianity and sci-
ence, the idea of method dominates the view of science.  
 The creation of modern science was also the creation 
of new meanings for curiosity. The rehabilitation of curi-
osity as a positive term was essential to the development 
of modern science. Peters14 points out how the changing 
meaning of curiosity was part of the discourse on explo-
ration and discovery leading up to Columbus. Legitimiz-
ing travel to distant places, as well as exploration of the 
world – including exploration for commercial purposes 
such as mining – was necessary because travel and explo-
ration were not always seen as positive acts. The recrea-
tion of the meaning of curiosity was used to validate such 
explorations and discovery of the secrets of the world. 
Part of this programme of legitimization was related to 
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 Scientists were consciously aware of the changing dis-
course on curiosity and in fact worked towards promoting 
new meanings of curiosity. Perhaps the best illustration 
of this is in the way the Royal Society used curiosity in 
the 18th century15. For science, the validation of wanting 
to learn about new and strange phenomena rested on the 
idea of curiosity. The Royal Society in the first half of the 
18th century contributed to the value of curiosity through 
various institutional means. In the communications pre-
sented to the Society, not only medical events but also  
astronomical ones were often described as being curious. 
As Costa notes, even the ‘certificates of election pre-
sented to the Society also illustrate this ‘language of  
curiosity’ (ibid., p. 148). For example, a certificate pre-
sented to Henry Stevens ‘described him as “gentleman of 
extensive curiosity” ’. Costa argues that ‘being curious’ 
was promoted as an important trait of being a scientist 
and the ‘pursuit of curiosities’ as being a valuable act. 
The Society took it upon itself to promote this practice of 
curiosity – so there were ‘regular exhibitions of natural 
and artificial curiosities at the meetings’, members were 
encouraged to have their own collection of curiosities and 
it became a tradition for the Fellows to donate curiosities 
(Newton donated a ‘small bird brought from Pennsyl-
vania’ (ibid., p. 159)).  
 Curiosities played an important role not only in the  
activities of the Society but also in framing definitions of 
knowledge and science in the 18th century. Costa con-
cludes by noting that the ‘place of curiosities of nature at 
The Royal Society therefore shows the variety and intri-
cacy of elements involved in the making and diffusion of 
natural knowledge in the period’ (ibid., p. 160). In the  
latter 18th century the preoccupation on curiosities de-
creased but by then curiosity had been completely reha-
bilitated. In fact, one can already see this influence of 
scientific curiosity in literature. The most notable exam-
ple is that of detective fiction. The detective story is often 
modelled on the scientific and has various instincts of the 
scientific in it. Edgar Allan Poe is often credited as being 
the author of the first modern detective novel (Murders in 
the Rue Morgue) – this novel ‘presents itself as scien-
tific’16. Positive virtues of curiosity – including a passion 
for it as well as something which is a disinterested en-
quiry – have marked the history of the modern detective. 
The ‘jargon of scientific enquiry’ was a primary influence 
on fictional detectives (ibid., p. 54) and the rehabilitation 
of curiosity had an important role to play in this. 
 The discourse on pure and applied was also signifi-
cantly changed in the changing history of curiosity. Justi-
fication of knowledge in the early phase was based on its 
moral and religious usefulness. But later the justification 
is in terms of practical use – a move which, Harrison  
argues, also establishes the distance between the morality 
of the knower and the known. Thus, the shifting notion of 
usefulness in the context of scientific knowledge meant 
that the moral status of the scientist is irrelevant to the 
claims of that knowledge – herein we can see the begin-
nings of the imposed expulsion of ethics from scientific 
practice. The very fact that we often use ‘science’ (as an 
impersonal discipline, a method) instead of ‘scientist’ 
even in contexts where human agency is clear is another 
indication of the success of this project of erasing the 
human from nature, the ethical from the scientific.  
 The trajectory of the development of the narrative 
about curiosity has important lessons about ethics and 
science. As Blumenberg17 points out, curiosity for 
Augustine was a ‘temptation’. Curiosity today has come a 
long way from this view but in doing so, has also di-
vested any notion of responsibility. Among other positive 
virtues, it has come to be associated as a characteristic of 
children and also as a virtue related to innocence. It is 
this innocence of curiosity that science shares with chil-
dren and it is this innocence that is often the bulwark 
against insistent ethical questions towards science. It is 
this presumed innocence that makes scientists claim that 
their only duty is to discover ‘truths’, whatever be the 
consequence of such truths. Blumenberg’s argument is 
that scientific revolution, as exhibited in the case of ob-
servations made by Galileo with his telescope, liberated 
curiosity from the clutches of a religious morality. This 
leads to the escape from ‘self-restriction’ which, for 
Blumenberg, catalysed the enlightenment and the esta-
blishment of scientific method leading thereby to modern 
science. While this picture is perhaps too sweeping, it is 
nevertheless true that the removal of ‘self-restriction’ was 
and continues to be extremely important to the practice of 
science. The belief that there should be no fetters to sci-
entific thinking has its origins in this complex history18.  
The ethics of curiosity – reinvesting responsibility  
in curiosity 
The meaning of curiosity exhibits significant ambiguity. 
It has changed its meanings over the ages. There are a 
large number of terms that have been used synonymously 
and yet are not the same as curiosity: for example, in 
early modern period the following terms often overlapped 
the meaning of curiosity – wonder, marvel, admiration, 
interest, subtlety, rarity and so on (ibid., pp. 2–3). Resi-
dues of this semantic spread are to be found even in con-
temporary uses of curiosity, particularly by science.  
 The scientific valorization of curiosity and the freedom 
it entails (or assumed to entail) needs to be questioned if 
a meaningful ethics of science is to be possible at all. To 
do this, we need to relook at the notion of curiosity and 
exhibit its multi-layeredness. If science continues to in-
vest heavily in curiosity then it should be answerable to 
these multiple meanings of curiosity. The very idea of  
curiosity is culturally mediated. It is part of a social proc-
ess and is constructed to suit various ends of dominant 
communities, be it religious or scientific. Curiosity itself 
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is value-laden with other virtues and vices. It is not re-
stricted to the individual but is essentially social.  
 Curiosity is also a catalyst for action. We indulge in 
various kinds of acts because we are curious to see how 
something would feel, how a dish would taste and so on. 
The way children play with insects is a good example to 
understand how action is related to curiosity. Some chi-
ldren see an insect and might want to play with it. They 
are curious about various behavioural aspects of the in-
sect. Inevitably, their curiosity gets the ‘better’ of them. 
They want to find out how the butterfly will fly if its 
wings are cut off, they are curious to see whether an ant 
will drown if dropped in a bowl of water, they are curious 
to see the reaction of dogs when they tie crackers on their 
tails and so on. To a great extent, these ‘experiments’ are 
driven by a sense of curiosity – a curiosity which is not 
regulated and which allows the children to do what they 
want to these creatures in the name of curiosity.  
 Scientific action is also many times significantly cata-
lysed by curiosity. Scientists want to see at what tempera-
ture water will boil, they are curious whether a given 
element will conduct heat and electricity, curious about 
the melting temperature of objects and so on. Driven by 
this curiosity, they perform their experiments. They boil 
water, send electricity through an element and so on. The 
freedom to do as our curiosity dictates is the quintessence 
of doing science. In fact, we can see why the idea of pure 
curiosity is so essential to science because it is within this 
notion that the idea of freedom is contained. Pure curio-
sity is the scientific synonym for pure freedom, freedom 
without responsibilities, freedom without constraints. The 
model for this kind of freedom is the mind. While there 
are constraints on what a body can do or even what can 
be done to physical entities, there is nothing in principle to 
shackle our imagination, to regulate what the mind can 
think of. 
 However, ethics arises in order to control curiosity, 
among other things. When a scientist wants to test the 
limits of pain of a human being by subjecting the person 
to pain, we invoke ethics. We say that the curiosity of the 
scientist should be curtailed in this case. In modern ethi-
cal debates about science, particularly biology, the pri-
mary reason why ethics is invoked is because it involves 
human beings (or in some cases life forms such as ani-
mals). Where a life form is concerned, ethics is invoked 
to constrain curiosity and its consequences. But what 
about other areas of science? What about a physicist’s  
curiosity of how the universe was born or how stars col-
lapse or what fundamental particles there are? Should  
curiosity in these cases also be constrained?  
 The answer is an unequivocal yes. The ethical question 
in science first occurs when we ask what constrains curi-
osity of any kind. The recent drama about the experiment 
in CERN is an indication of the need to control curiosity. 
Scientists are obviously curious to know about the Higgs 
particle. This experiment in CERN, where particle colli-
sions will create energy of enormous magnitude, is an 
important one for science. It has the potential to satisfy the 
curiosity of the scientists about the origin of the universe, 
the Higgs particle and so on. But at what cost? Before 
this experiment, there were accounts of how some other 
physicists had predicted that a small black hole (with poten-
tial consequence of destroying the world) would be formed 
due to the high energy collision. While this claim was 
dismissed by the CERN scientists, it leads us to wonder 
about the rights of a few scientists to explore their curio-
sity. Independent of the merits of the black hole argu-
ment, it nevertheless poses an ethical question to modern 
science. What price the curiosity of a small group of in-
dividuals? And who should pay for it? Should there be 
limits to what they can explore knowing well that their 
curiosity can potentially destroy the world? But on the 
other hand, the chance of it happening is very low. But 
the flip side is that we have to take their word for it! How 
does one decide then? How do the scientists themselves 
decide individually on whether their search is worth the 
potential price? The question here is an ethical one but an 
ethical question whose subject matter is curiosity itself.  
 It is not only scientists who see curiosity as a virtue. 
Even philosophers have taken this position. For example, 
I discussed virtue epistemology earlier where curiosity is 
discussed as a virtue. Baumgarten19 discusses how curios-
ity can be seen to be a positive and moral virtue. He  
offers an interesting perspective on curiosity and its rela-
tionship to care. ‘Curiosity bears a close relationship to, 
and is often bound up with, care and concern. Curiosity is 
rooted linguistically in the other-regarding activities of 
“care” and “cure” (from the Latin curare, to take care 
of)’ (ibid., p. 2). In human interactions, this element of 
care makes curiosity not a morbid one but one which is 
an important part of friendship. Moreover, curiosity is 
necessary for deepening one’s friendship. Baumgarten 
believes that a similar process of curiosity towards non-
humans, such as ecosystem or another’s culture, strength-
ens the understanding of that object of curiosity. There-
fore, he concludes that ‘curiosity is a distinctive virtue 
which, compared to attentiveness and “being interested”, 
more fully expresses human autonomy, plays a distinctive 
role in caring relationships, and enables us to learn about 
things we would not otherwise know.’  
 Curiosity can also have a deontological status. Baum-
garten believes that it is our duty to be curious, a claim 
which should remind us of the scientific narrative about 
curiosity. However, in the fourth section of the paper, he 
suggests that it is also a duty not to be curious in certain 
cases. Also, too much curiosity may be seen as a vice and 
not a positive virtue. So it leads him to consider morbid 
curiosity, debasing curiosity, voyeuristic curiosity as 
negative variants of curiosity. In the last section of his 
paper, he connects curiosity and living well: ‘To say that 
curiosity is a virtue is to claim, most importantly, that it 
helps one to live well.’ This is indeed a problematic addi-
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tion to the idea of curiosity because what defines ‘living 
well’ is extremely contentious, particularly in the context 
of modern science and the development that it has entai-
led. Curiosity also does the job of supplying meaning in 
life and thus has an existential role. Baumgarten con-
cludes by contrasting the religious suspicion towards  
curiosity as against secular notions of curiosity that em-
phasizes certain positive virtues but ends by saying that 
the richest life is one that combines the two.  
 This ambiguity present in any positive rendering of  
curiosity is but a natural consequence of the ambiguity 
present in the concept of curiosity. Trying to relate it to 
‘well-being’ and ‘caring’ as Baumgarten does is very 
problematic, particularly for science’s appropriation of 
curiosity. If curiosity towards nature is a fundamental 
impulse for science, then how is this curiosity related to 
the notion of care towards nature? On the contrary, curi-
osity in science often manifests itself in the most extreme 
forms of the exploitation of nature. Furthermore, attempts 
to salvage curiosity by considering it as the element lead-
ing to well-being are also problematical because the defini-
tion of well-being is so different across different 
communities and cultures.  
 Thus, the fundamental problem is to come back to the 
ancient and medieval question about curiosity: how does 
one regulate it? For science which is very much depend-
ent upon the idea of ‘pure’, unfettered curiosity, a regu-
lated curiosity is undesirable. Regulating curiosity cannot 
just be a normative process. It cannot be regulated by re-
ligion or by the State. There has to be a self-regulative 
process in science, a self-restraint, if these ethical con-
cerns are going to have any impact. And any ‘self-ethical’ 
move within science must first of all begin by asking 
what constitutes the boundaries of curiosity. About what 
are we allowed to be curious? At what point should we 
desist from being curious? And so on.  
 Interestingly, other cultures illustrate possibilities of 
understanding curiosity differently. Consider the Indian 
philosophical and religious tradition. Unlike the Western 
tradition, curiosity as a concept is not easily discovered 
either in ordinary language, or in myths or even in philoso-
phical traditions. It is difficult to find a consistent narra-
tive about the evil effects of curiosity like in the Greek 
and the Christian tradition. Doubt as a concept seems to 
be more prominent in Indian philosophical systems as 
compared to the notion of curiosity. Indian theories de-
velop quite sophisticated analysis of doubt and doubt as a 
category is often associated with the origin of knowledge.  
 It is also quite difficult to find examples of pure curio-
sity. This is consistent with the general pragmatic and 
empirical worldview that influences various Indian tradi-
tions, including the traditions of philosophy and logic. 
Even mathematics in India did not make the shift to the 
kinds of formal, non-empirical systems that arose in 
Greek mathematics. Indian mathematics was essentially 
grounded in various empirical and practical concerns. 
Thus, a regulative element seems to be universally pre-
sent in the Indian classical traditions. This presence of a 
regulative necessity places bounds on reason and desire – 
two elements so closely associated with curiosity. Even in 
the Western tradition, the criticism of curiosity is funda-
mentally about ‘pure’ curiosity or ‘intellectual’ curiosity 
but this kind of a ‘pure’ act is fundamentally not possible 
in the Indian worldview. Indian mathematics is not pure 
mathematics since it is essentially engaged with the world 
and nature; Indian logic is not pure logic since there are 
demands of the empirical which logical analysis has to 
incorporate in inferences; Indian metaphysics is not pure 
metaphysics since epistemological categories often get 
‘mixed’ up with ‘pure’ metaphysical categories and so 
on11,20. Bhattacharya21 discusses how in Indian philosophy 
‘ethics and metaphysics are inextricably connected’. The 
Indian traditions therefore, exhibit the basic critique of the 
‘pure’ in various activities. Perhaps this explains why the 
suspicion towards ‘pure’ curiosity was not so central to 
Indian thought as it was to the Christian tradition. But this 
also implies that the possibility of ethics is fundamentally 
ingrained into any activity since the normative is essen-
tial to every kind of physical, intellectual or spiritual act.  
 But given the hegemony of Western knowledge it 
might need lot more effort to make the case for alternate 
philosophical (including ethical) traditions to contribute 
to the discussion on ethics and science. In what follows, I 
would like to set out an argument which will allow us to 
establish an ethical critique of pure curiosity. First of all, 
a consequentialist approach will not help. One can argue 
that scientists should take ethical responsibility for the 
horrors of the nuclear bomb. Yet scientists rarely do so. 
The standard argument is that the bomb is not due to sci-
ence but due to politicians and others who take the decision 
to produce and then use the bomb. So, negative conse-
quences alone is not a sufficient reason for imposing 
ethical constraint on scientific activity since the scientists 
deflect the ethical component to other agents. In doing so, 
they also reify pure curiosity. 
 So what is the argument one can make about the dangers 
of pure curiosity – an argument that is not consequential-
ist alone? The first question we need to ask is this: who 
has the right to be curious? Under what conditions can we 
be curious? What can we be curious about? Who has the 
right to interrogate – whether it is other humans or nature? 
What are the necessary requirements before one can take 
on the role of an interrogator of nature?  
 We need to first recognize that various rights underlie 
every act that we do. And rights are granted to us (by the 
community) or taken by us (from the community). What 
we take to be an act of individual autonomy and personal 
choice is often one that is actually not only granted  
by social conditions but also enabled by these conditions. 
That is, when we perform an act it is not only that there 
are no constraining conditions stopping us from doing it 
but there are also positive, enabling conditions that allow 
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us to perform that act. And these enabling and non-
constraining conditions are the contributions of other 
people, social structures and so on. Given that rights 
granted to us by others are an essential part of every act 
of ours then there is immediately a question of responsi-
bility that is intrinsic to every act of an individual. Thus, 
social mores decide our behaviour in society and even in 
families. Everything that we do in a social setting is mod-
erated and constrained by various factors.  
 Modern science – like art – reacts against this constant 
constraint imposed on us – whether they are constraints 
of nature or society. Morality arises in an attempt to curtail 
various desires of the body and as members of a commu-
nity many of these constraints are accepted by scientists 
and artists also. What remained to be unfettered was the 
mind and while morality did attempt to find ethical con-
straints of the mind, it is far more difficult to regulate. 
For example, one could insist that it is wrong to think 
certain kinds of thoughts. But it is difficult to know when 
a person indeed indulges in such thoughts unless he or 
she acts in a particular manner that exhibits these thoughts. 
Here, it is pertinent to remember that while art privileges 
the notion of freedom and self-expression, the importance 
of curiosity for artists seems to be very different as com-
pared to scientists. Artists do not invoke the idea of un-
fettered curiosity to justify their activities. Thus, they are 
able to engage with creativity without using curiosity as a 
bulwark to protect them against ethical challenges. In 
other words, they do not find a need to create an ideology 
of curiosity. Instead, as Akshara notes (pers. commun.), 
they create an ideology of pleasure to legitimize their work!  
 The freedom of the mind and therefore the freedom of 
the subject becomes a central issue for science and art. 
And among the first freedoms that are demanded is the 
freedom of expression and thought. But does freedom of 
expression mean that a person can say what he or she 
wants independent of the consequences? For proponents 
of freedom, this freedom is extremely important and even 
if one accepts a constraint on this freedom it can only be 
from the individual self. That is, there cannot be any  
external agent proscribing freedom of expression. But 
this means that at the same time there should be a sense 
of self-control in what we say. So even though we do not 
accept any external agent from stopping us in saying what 
we want, this full freedom of expression is then accept-
able only if there is self-restraint.  
 What holds true for saying what we want also holds for 
thinking what we want and for being curious about what 
we want. Once curiosity is taken into the discourse of 
freedom and made a virtue of by science then it is indeed 
difficult to put external constraints on curiosity. Religion 
or philosophy cannot in principle put norms on the act of 
scientific thinking and doing. The constraints on curiosity 
have to come from within science. But the paradox is that 
science and scientists do not have the capacity or the in-
terest to constrain their thoughts and actions especially 
since what justifies their activity are these ideological 
values they ascribe to notions such as curiosity and free-
dom. So how then is this self-restraint possible? This can 
happen only through a dialogic process with other com-
munities. Let me set out the argument for this. 
 Scientists are members of a larger society. Even if they 
want to project themselves as a special set of people  
involved in a special kind of activity, there is no possibi-
lity of science without it being seen as a part of a larger 
society. In most countries, science still continues to be 
under the patronage of the State. Modern states invest 
huge amounts of money into scientific institutions 
thereby enabling the activity of science. So should scien-
tists be answerable to the society they belong to and 
which sustains their work? In what follows, I will only 
consider one aspect of this larger issue. 
 Consider the right to interrogate. In a society not every-
body has the right to interrogate – lawyers can do so but 
only in a courtroom or under accepted conditions, police 
can do so but only under constraining procedures, judges 
have the right but again only under certain conditions, 
parents want the right all the time with respect to their 
children but even they often have to follow certain said 
and unsaid norms.  
 In all these cases, nobody has the right to question 
without any accompanying constraints. Police, judges, 
lawyers, parents, colleagues – none of them have a right 
to be curious about another person without having inbuilt 
constraint on what they can ask, what they can explore 
and so on. In our society, everybody seems to have con-
straints – many of them being self-regulated – except for 
the scientists when it comes to curiosity about the world. 
 Thus, the first step in the ethics of science is to impose 
constraints on curiosity but this imposition cannot be done 
from outside, by other people but must be done internally, 
by the individual self of the scientist. There are many 
cases where this has happened. Individual scientists even 
today refuse to participate in certain kinds of research 
projects – for example, in defence projects, in nuclear 
projects and so on. These are constraints these individual 
scientists place upon the nature of their work. However, 
they do not take the next step of constraining their curio-
sity per se.  
 And this is exactly what the scientists resist. For exam-
ple, Kurtz22 points out that scientific inquiry has always 
been under challenge from religion, politics and so on. 
Today, he believes, the attempt to muzzle science comes 
in the guise of ethics. While he agrees that practical  
research and technology might need some kind of regula-
tion he suggests that in the case of pure science there 
should be no such constraints. Thus, he says, in the ‘area 
of knowledge and truth, I submit, scientists ought, on 
utilitarian grounds, to be allowed to inquire as they see 
fit and to publish their results without the imposition of 
external standards of judgment as to the ethical worth of 
their investigations’ (ibid., p. 66). This statement betrays 
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the ideological grounds on which science is possible. 
There is no independent definition of knowledge and 
truth. There are no activities in a society which are not 
under imposition of certain constraints. Hiding behind 
pure science and pure curiosity will not help. Scientists 
cannot be allowed to inquire ‘as they see fit’. I am not 
talking about potential use of their results but the very 
mode of legitimate inquiry.  
 This argument might be construed to imply that scien-
tists have no right to be curious and that once they lose 
this freedom of curiosity, science will not be able to de-
velop. It is not enough to say that scientists should not 
have unlimited freedom of curiosity. I would not want to 
take this line since it is then open to regulating intellec-
tual activity by various vested interests. Instead, I suggest 
that the ethical basis of social communities lies in dialo-
gue and negotiations. It lies in one set of people trying 
sincerely to convince the other members of the reasons 
for their action. Scientific curiosity has the most impact 
on society – whether it is curiosity about what new fea-
tures can be added in a cell phone to curiosity about the 
origins of the universe. Both these extremes do have  
material impact on the world.  
 Scientists have taken the easy way out when confron-
ted with this need to have responsibility. They have often 
projected themselves as an exclusive group and insist that 
the larger society cannot understand them. They are thus 
not only exclusive but also exclusionist. It is remarkable 
how so many scientists believe that they need not engage 
with society and establish a dialogue with the members of 
this larger society, which will include the religious, the 
non-religious, the skeptic and so on. Moreover, modern 
science has been dismissive of other different kinds of 
knowledge systems. It is dominantly eurocentric in char-
acter. Thus, very well developed empirical knowledge as 
in Indian medical systems or even theoretical insights 
from Indian logic have all been arrogantly dismissed by 
modern science and scientists. Hundreds of such exam-
ples abound from all cultures in the world. Moreover, sci-
ence is also paternalistic and patriarchal. It has embodied a 
very male view of the world and knowledge, as extensive 
literature in science studies and feminist studies has so 
well illustrated. Science has not shown the capacity to be 
inclusive, to seriously engage with other systems of 
knowing, to even consider philosophy seriously particu-
larly in themes such as truth and reality, and so on. Until 
it is able to do all this it cannot demand the right to have 
free enquiry. As constituents of a society it has to practise 
restraints which is present on all members of the society.  
 In other words, the freedom to be curious is not a free-
dom at all. Nor is unbridled curiosity innocent, nor is it 
really unbridled. There is nothing new in asking for res-
ponsibility in freedom. But what we should realize is that 
the first responsibility in science is not just towards spe-
cific scientific acts (such as whether there should be nu-
clear power, stem cell research and so on) but towards the 
very act of curiosity. There is little that is ‘natural’ about 
curiosity. Moreover, it is never restricted to the indivi-
dual. If science proves anything, it is that curiosity is  
often manifested as a collective process. This is the  
curiosity related to research programmes in a broad 
sense. In this sense, scientific curiosity is always ‘social’ 
curiosity. An integral component of such curiosity is the 
role of the social and that role is one of responsibility to-
wards the members constituting the social.  
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